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Abstract 
The concept of metaphor, in particular graphical (or visual) metaphor, is 
central to the field of information visualization. Information graphics and 
interactive information visualization systems employ a variety of 
metaphorical devices to make abstract, complex, voluminous, or 
otherwise difficult-to-comprehend information understandable in 
graphical terms. This paper explores the use of metaphor in information 
visualization, advancing the theory previously argued by Johnson, 
Lakoff, Tversky et al. that many information graphics are metaphorically 
understood in terms of cognitively entrenched spatial patterns known as 
image schemas. These patterns serve to structure and constrain abstract 
reasoning processes via metaphorical projection operations that are 
grounded in everyday perceptual experiences with phenomena such as 
containment, movement, and force dynamics. Building on previous 
research, I argue that information graphics promote comprehension of 
their target information through the use of graphical patterns that invoke 
these preexisting schematic structures. I further theorize that the degree 
of structural alignment of a particular graphic with one or more 
corresponding image schemas accounts for its perceived degree of 
intuitiveness. Accordingly, image schema theory can provide a powerful 
explanatory and predictive framework for visualization research. I review 
relevant theories of analogy and metaphor, and discuss the image 
schematic properties of several common types of information graphic. I 
conclude with the proposal that the inventory of image schemas culled 
from linguistic studies can serve as the basis for an inventory of design 
elements suitable for developing intuitive and effective new information 
visualization techniques. 
 
Keywords: Graphical metaphor, analogy, image schemas, information 
design, perception, cognition 
 
 
Introduction 
Information graphics
i
 derive much of their power to inform and 
enlighten through the use of graphical (or visual) metaphors. For 
example, the length of a bar in a bar chart metaphorically represents a 
quantity of objects. Likewise, a tree diagram represents hierarchical 
relations existing among some set of abstract concepts. As with 
linguistic metaphors, visual metaphors map the characteristics of some 
well-understood source domain to a more poorly understood target 
domain so as to render aspects of the target understandable in terms of 
the source. In the case of information graphics, the source domain 
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is a visuospatial pattern of some type, while the target 
domain is some characteristic of the information of 
interest. The question naturally arises, What are the 
characteristics of these spatial patterns that make them 
suitable as metaphorical source domains? In other 
words, what makes information graphics themselves 
meaningful, independent of phenomena they represent? 
Further, how does this meaning come about? Is it 
simply a matter of learned convention, or do we have 
some ingrained predisposition to understand certain 
graphical forms in particular ways? I argue here that the 
process of deriving meaning from information graphics 
likely involves both factors. 
 
This paper advances the theory first argued by Johnson,
1
 
Lakoff,
2
 and, more recently, Tversky,
3,4
 that many 
information graphics are metaphorically understood in 
terms of image schemas, structural patterns that become 
established in our minds during early childhood in the 
course of our daily interactions with the world. 
According to image schema theory, early perceptual 
experiences with spatial phenomena such as 
containment, path-following, and object dynamics 
become generalized and subconsciously entrenched. 
These spatial frameworks are subsequently recruited for 
use in structuring and understanding more complex, 
abstract concepts. Image schemas are thus theorized to 
form a crucial link between perception and cognition, 
with obvious implications for information visualization. 
 
To date, image schema theory and research has focused 
largely on the metaphorical use of spatial relations 
terminology in language. However, it seems likely that 
sign systems of all types have evolved to express 
conceptual relationships in image schematic terms, and, 
in turn, are interpreted according to their alignment with 
contextually appropriate schemas. This especially 
includes information graphics. In fact, the theoretically 
close structural and functional alignment of such 
graphics with these schemas may explain their uniquely 
powerful characteristics relative to other (e.g., 
linguistic) modes of expression.  
 
While previous authors have largely limited their 
discussions to the image schematic characteristics of 
simple statistical graphics, I argue here that it seems 
likely that most, if not all, information graphics (in 
particular visualizations of abstract information) are 
ultimately understood in image schematic terms. I 
further argue that many interaction techniques 
commonly used in information visualization, such as 
progressive disclosure, can also be considered to have 
an image schematic basis. Consequently, image schema 
theory can provide a useful explanatory and predictive 
framework for guiding the design and evaluation of 
information visualization technologies. 
 
In section 2 of this paper I review the prevailing theories 
of analogy and metaphor, including a discussion of the 
unique characteristics of graphical metaphors. In this 
section I make a crucial distinction between analogical 
graphics, which depict characteristics of inherently 
spatial phenomena, and metaphorical graphics, which 
depict abstract phenomena and are theoretically 
interpreted in image schematic terms. In section 3, I 
review image schema theory, including emerging 
evidence for their objective existence. This is followed, 
in section 4, by a discussion of the image schematic 
characteristics of a number of commonly used 
information graphics and interactive visualization 
techniques. In section 5, on the basis of the previous 
discussions, I propose that the standard inventory of 
image schemas derived from psychological and 
linguistic studies can serve as the basis for developing a 
graphical “grammar” suitable for information 
visualization purposes. I go on to discuss a proposed 
visualization design process that matches characteristics 
of the data and problem domains with graphical 
representations designed to invoke appropriate image 
schematic reasoning processes, and illustrate the 
concept with a hypothetical example. In section 6, I 
conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications 
of this approach, and of image schema theory in 
general, for future information visualization research. 
 
Analogy, metaphor, and graphical metaphors 
 
It is now generally accepted that analogy and metaphor 
are key aspects of human cognition.
5,6,7
 Previously 
considered aberrational and peripheral aspects of 
thought, analogical processes are now understood to 
play key roles in everyday communication, and underlie 
many, if not most, abstract reasoning processes.
8,9,10
 We 
constantly use knowledge about things we already 
understand to help us make sense out of other, less well 
understood phenomena. Our capacity for metaphor, a 
special type of analogy, enables us to extend knowledge 
about things we understand to completely different 
domains of experience. Graphical metaphors enable us 
to understand such abstract concepts in terms of familiar 
and well-understood visuospatial phenomena. 
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Formally, analogy is defined as a cognitive process 
whereby the characteristics of a well-understood source 
(or base) domain are used to facilitate the 
comprehension of a more poorly understood target 
domain. This process involves a structure-mapping 
operation
ii
 in which the source and target domain 
representations are aligned, and features of the source 
are projected to the target via inference.
11
 According to 
Gentner’s structure-mapping model of analogy 
comprehension, the features that are preferentially 
selected for projection are those that express systematic 
relations among relevant concepts in the source domain 
(ibid.). 
 
In the structure-mapping model, domains and situations 
are represented as systems of conceptual objects, object-
attributes, and inter-object relations. Knowledge is 
represented in the form of propositional networks of 
nodes and predicates in which the nodes represent 
objects (i.e., concepts), and predicates applied to the 
nodes express propositions about the associated 
concepts. Predicates that take a single object as an 
argument are referred to as attributes (e.g., 
YELLOW(x)), while those that take two or more 
arguments are referred to as relations (e.g., SMALLER 
THAN (x, y)). Gentner makes an additional key 
distinction between first-order predicates, which take 
objects as arguments, and second- and higher-order 
relations, which take propositions as arguments. For 
example, if HEAT(x, y) and WARM(y) are first-order 
predicates, CAUSE [HEAT(x, y), WARM(y)] is a 
second-order predicate. Structure-mapping operations 
can therefore involve not only individual objects, but 
also mappings between relations of objects and between 
relations of relations. 
 
The analogy “A T is (like) an S” defines a mapping of 
characteristics of a source domain S to a target domain 
T. If the source domain is expressed in terms of nodes 
s1, s2,… si  and predicates such as A, R, and R′, and the 
target domain has nodes t1, t2,… ti , then an analogy is 
defined as a mapping of selected object nodes of S onto 
the objects nodes of T: 
 
 M: si    > ti (1) 
 
Predicates from the source domain S are transferred to 
the target domain T where they are used to generate a  
candidate set of inferences about the nodes in T.  
 
Gentner goes on to define a set of mapping rules that 
govern the transfer: 
 
 1. Ignore object attributes: 
 
 A(si)]   /  > [A(ti) (2) 
 
 Intuitively, this means that the specific properties of 
objects in the source domain are typically not used 
in making inferences about objects in the target 
domain. For example, in the analogy “a collection 
of hyperlinked documents is like a spider web,” 
most of the physical properties of spider webs such 
as their stickiness, fragility, etc. are ignored in the 
transfer. 
 
 2. Try to preserve relations between objects: 
 
 R(si, sj)]    > [R(ti, tj) (3) 
 
 In the preceding example, the most salient 
characteristic of the source domain is the pattern of 
connectivity of the strands of the spider web, which 
is mapped to the pattern of connectivity among 
hyperlinked documents. In this case, the structural 
relationships among the component parts of spider 
webs are used to understand structural relationships 
among documents that reference one another. 
 
 3. In deciding which relations to preserve, 
preferentially select systems of relations rather than 
individual relations (the Systematicity Principle): 
 
 R′ (R1(si, sj), R2(sk, sl))]    > [R′ (R1(ti, tj), R2(tk, tl)) (4) 
 
 This is to say that we seek interpretations involving 
systems of interconnected knowledge over those 
involving independent facts. Source domains that 
contribute sets of relations that are themselves 
systematically related (i.e., that involve higher-
order relations) support the generation of larger 
numbers of candidate inferences (and hence have 
more explanatory power) than those that contribute 
only individual relations. “An atom is like a tiny 
solar system” is a much “richer” analogy than “an 
atom is like a tiny ball.” 
 
There are several additional key features of the 
structure-mapping model. The first is that explanatory 
analogies normally involve a 1-1 mapping between 
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nodes in the source domain and nodes in the target 
domain. The second is that relations in the source 
domain are understood to apply identically in the target 
domain. The third is that the structure-mapping model is 
purely syntactic in nature. The actual content of the 
relations is entirely variable, and may be static spatial 
information as in INSIDE(x,y), or constraint or dynamic 
causal information.  
 
In analogical comparisons, the structure-mapping 
process favors rich, deep, contextually relevant systems 
of relational matches over shallow systems (the 
Systematicity Principle). Once an initial matching has 
been established, unmatched predicates present in the 
source structure but not in the target structure are 
considered as candidate inferences in the target. 
Analogy is therefore a form of induction. Because these 
candidate inferences serve to complete the target 
structure in a deep and systematically consistent way, 
they are often causally informative. As a consequence, 
analogical structure-mapping processes can lead to 
spontaneous and informative insights – the “ah-ha!” 
experience.
10
 In this way, analogies enable new 
knowledge about the target domain to be acquired in a 
sometimes sudden and spectacular fashion. 
 
Gentner distinguishes analogies from other types of 
domain comparisons according to the syntactic type of 
the shared versus nonshared predicates. Comparisons in 
which the ratio of mapped to nonmapped predicates are 
high, and which involve both object attribute and 
relational predicates, are referred to as literal 
similarities. An example of a literal similarity is “a 
mallet is like a hammer”; mallets and hammers share 
many material and structural characteristics. Analogies 
are comparisons involving relational predicates, but 
relatively few object attribute predicates, as previously 
discussed. Comparisons in which the converse is true, 
i.e., in which there is substantial overlap in object 
attributes but not in relations, are considered simply 
appearance matches. Finally, domain comparisons in 
which the source domain is an abstract relational 
structure, as in, for example, “a pulley is a simple 
machine,” are referred to as abstractions. 
 
Metaphor is a special type of analogy in which the 
source and target domains are semantically distant from 
one another.
7
 In addition, concepts from the source and 
target domains are often blended together, rather than 
discretely mapped (ibid.). Metaphors are commonly 
signaled in language by the words “is a.” For example, 
the phrase “an atom is like a tiny solar system” is an 
analogy; “all the world’s a stage” is a metaphor. In both 
cases, however, knowledge about some better-
understood entity or phenomenon is projected onto one 
that is less familiar or more complex or abstract in order 
to render it more intelligible.
iii
 
 
Linguists differentiate among several subtypes of 
metaphor. Of most relevance to the present discussion is 
the concept of dead or conceptual metaphors.
2,8
 These 
terms refer to metaphors that have become so 
entrenched in thinking and language that they go almost 
completely unnoticed in everyday use. For example, the 
phrase “grasp the concept” employs the conceptual 
metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (that can be 
grasped).
8
 This metaphor is so established in our 
thought processes that its metaphorical nature passes 
unnoticed, as such, in actual use.
iv
 As I will later argue, 
many of the graphical tropes employed in information 
visualization seem to be of this nature. 
 
Metaphors and analogies are conceptual phenomena that 
can be expressed in multiple ways, for example 
linguistically (as in the previous examples) or 
graphically.
v
 As with linguistic analogies, graphical 
analogies and metaphors make assertions about relations 
existing among some target set of concepts in terms of 
some source relational structure. In the graphical case, 
however, source relations are expressed in the form of a 
graphical construct of some kind. Graphics that qualify 
as analogical according to the structure-mapping model 
of analogy thus have the following characteristics: 
 
 1. They express systematic relations among the 
elements of a target domain in terms of those of 
some source domain. 
 2. They preserve only selected attributes of elements 
in the target domain. 
 3, There is a 1-1 mapping of elements in the source 
domain to elements in the target domain. 
 4. Relations in the source domain apply identically in 
the target domain. 
 5. The components of such graphics are syntactically 
neutral, that is, the same graphical elements can be 
applied to multiple target domains. 
 
Graphical metaphors have the additional characteristics: 
 
 6. The target domain is semantically distant from the 
source domain. 
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 7. Elements of the source and target domains may be 
conceptually blended, rather than discretely 
mapped. 
 
Accordingly, information graphics which (spatially) 
depict inherently spatial phenomena, such as geographic 
maps, building blueprints, and molecular diagrams, can 
be considered graphical analogues of the things they 
depict. That is to say, such graphics preserve systematic 
spatial and topological relationships present among 
elements of the target domain, convey only selected 
attributes of those elements, and the graphics are 
semantically close to the target phenomenon. Such 
graphics serve to make the spatial phenomena they 
depict more understandable by filtering, compressing, 
rescaling, and otherwise abstracting salient aspects of 
the target domain in order to bring them within the 
scope of human perceptual and cognitive abilities. 
 
In graphical metaphors, on the other hand, the source 
domain is a spatial pattern of some type that has clearly 
understood relational characteristics, but is semantically 
distant from the target phenomena that is depicted. This 
is to say that the spatial pattern includes discrete, 
perceptually salient components that bear some 
meaningful spatial or topological relationship to one 
another, but which are mapped to a (nominally) non-
spatial target domain. As with graphical analogues, 
however, the relational characteristics of the spatial 
source domain are used to generate inferences in the 
target. In other words, graphical metaphors promote the 
understanding of abstract concepts in terms of well 
understood visuospatial phenomena of some kind.  
 
One common type of metaphorical graphic maps 
knowledge about a source domain to some target 
domain by means of pictorial representations of 
physical objects and/or meaningful arrangements of 
such objects. The characteristics of the objects 
employed are transferred to the target domain where 
they promote inferences associated with the function of 
the object. Typically, both object attributes and 
relational predicates contribute, although (as with 
metaphors in general) relational predicates predominate. 
In addition, the objects employed are usually commonly 
encountered, human-scale artifacts chosen for maximum 
familiarity and hence maximal explanatory power. This 
type of graphic might be said to employ mimetic 
graphical metaphor in that its symbolic and relational 
characteristics stem from the characteristics of the 
physical objects that are depicted. 
For example, a representation of a bridge might be 
employed in a business presentation to express the 
metaphor “this marketing plan is a bridge to the future.” 
The near and far ends of the bridge might be labeled 
“Now” and “Next Year,” respectively, while the bridge 
itself might be labeled “Marketing Plan.” In this way, 
the concept of a plan for achieving some desired result 
in the future is associated with the concept of a bridge 
connecting two physical locations that enables easy 
movement between them and/or the avoidance of some 
physical hazard. Physical movement between the two 
ends of the bridge is equated with a transition from one 
state to another. As a metaphorical source domain, the 
concept of “bridge” compactly encapsulates a nested 
system of relations involving notions of facilitated 
locomotion and hazard avoidance, as well as physical 
attributes such as strength and reliability. The target 
domain of “marketing plans” is clearly highly abstract 
and complex. In this case, the mapping promotes an 
understanding of only the most superficial aspects of the 
target domain in terms of equally superficial aspects of 
the source domain. 
 
Graphical metaphors employing representations of 
physical objects have a long history of use, for example 
in art. Such depictions commonly involve the symbolic 
use of multiple objects arranged in meaningful spatial 
configurations that metaphorically (or allegorically) 
express relations among the concepts the objects 
represent. Renaissance painters, for example, used the 
positioning of symbolic objects in their compositions to 
express relations such as relative importance, 
superiority/inferiority and ordinality. These artists knew 
that certain spatial elements, patterns, and 
configurations would carry inherent meaning for their 
viewers, and constructed their illustrations accordingly. 
The situation with information graphics is analogous. 
Information designers routinely take for granted the fact 
that certain design elements and configurations have 
particular, abstract meanings. Even highly abstract 
graphics such as network diagrams depicting social 
relationships are immediately understandable. Why is it 
that certain spatial patterns are able to imbue ostensibly 
unrelated, abstract concepts with meaning? 
 
The answer seems to be that we are conditioned from 
birth to organize and reason about abstract concepts in 
spatial terms. According to emerging theories of 
embodied cognition, early perceptual experiences with 
phenomena such as movement and force dynamics 
become abstracted and schematized. These schemas 
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subsequently serve as “structural archetypes” for 
organizing and understanding more abstract and 
complex concepts. They are so cognitively entrenched 
as to be essentially “invisible” in practical use; in other 
words, they function as conceptual metaphors. Because 
they have a largely visuoperceptual basis, these 
structural patterns have been termed image schemas. 
According to theory, the metaphorical use of image 
schemas provides the basis for much of our conscious 
thought. The inherent spatial nature of many of our 
thought processes provides a strong rationale for the 
utility of information graphics, and, as I will argue later, 
may be responsible for the invention and gradual 
evolution of the variety of information graphics we see 
today.  
 
Image schema theory and the Spatialization 
of Form hypothesis 
 
Image schema theory was first articulated by Johnson in 
a seminal text published in 1987,
1
 and further elaborated 
by Lakoff that same year.
2
 This work, in turn, emerged 
from Talmy
12,13,14
 and Langacker’s15 empirical research 
on spatial-relations terms in language, as well as on 
Lakoff and Johnson’s earlier theories regarding the 
importance of metaphor in human language and 
thought.
5,8
 The essence of image schema theory is that 
recurrent patterns of kinesthetic and perceptual 
experience (e.g., physical movements, visual patterns) 
become subconsciously entrenched in our minds during 
early development. These patterns are subsequently 
recruited for use in abstract thinking. In other words, we 
use frequently encountered kinesthetic and perceptual 
patterns metaphorically to structure abstract concepts in 
thought and language. As I will argue, it seems likely 
that we use similar mechanisms in both constructing and 
interpreting graphical representations of abstract 
information. 
 
In 
16
, Hampe summarizes image schema theory as 
follows: 
 
 Image schemas are directly meaningful 
(“experiential”/“embodied”), preconceptual struc-
tures, which arise from, or are grounded in, human 
recurrent bodily movements through space, 
perceptual interactions, and ways of manipulating 
objects. 
 Image schemas are highly schematic gestalts [that] 
capture the structural contours of sensory-motor  
experience, integrating information from multiple 
modalities. 
 Image schemas exist as continuous and analogue 
patterns beneath conscious awareness, prior to and 
independently of other concepts. 
 As gestalts, image schemas are both internally 
structured, i.e., made up of very few related parts, 
and highly flexible. This flexibility becomes 
manifest in the numerous transformations they 
undergo in various experiential contexts, all of 
which are closely related to perceptual (gestalt) 
principles.
vi
 
 
According to theory, image schemas serve a special 
cognitive role in that they are both perceptual and 
conceptual in nature. They thus act as a bridge between 
our perceptual systems and “higher level” cognitive 
functions such as language and reasoning.
17
 As Turner 
points out in 
18
, if we had evolved as amorphous, one-
eyed creatures floating in liquid we would have no basis 
for forming concepts such as LEFT-RIGHT, 
UP-DOWN, NEAR-FAR, etc. But because we have 
evolved as bisymmetrical, binocular creatures in 
gravity, we naturally employ our bodily experiences as 
the basis for conceiving and describing more abstract 
concepts (e.g., she’s in over her head, you’re getting 
closer).  
 
Johnson characterizes image schemas as having a 
gestalt structure consisting of both highly schematic 
and relatively concrete and specific components. These 
two aspects can be considered analogous to the 
predicate-argument structures of propositional 
representations, with the maximally schematic 
components corresponding to arguments, and the more 
specific components corresponding to predicates. Deane 
notes that image schemas differ from propositional 
representations in a key way, however.
19
 While 
traditional propositional representations signify only 
abstract truth conditions, image schemas have an 
experiential basis. As a consequence, they foster mental 
operations analogous to the actual physical operations 
on which they are based. Accordingly, they operate in 
congruence with their own unique experiential “logic.”  
 
Below are descriptions of several of the canonical image 
schemas defined by Johnson. Following Lakoff’s format 
in 
2
, I include a description of the theoretical bodily 
basis for each schema, along with a description of the 
schema’s structural components and several example 
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metaphorical phrases illustrating their use in abstract 
concept structuring: 
 
 1. CONTAINMENT 
 Bodily Experience:  We experience our bodies as 
both containers for things (e.g., food) and things 
in containers (e.g., rooms). 
 Structural Elements:  An INTERIOR, a BOUND-
ARY, and an EXTERIOR 
 Example Metaphors:  come into view, in a relation-
ship, in debt, out of his mind 
 
 2. PART-WHOLE 
 Bodily Experience:  We are whole beings with 
component parts we can manipulate. 
 Structural Elements:  A WHOLE with component 
PARTS, and a CONFIGURATION 
 Example Metaphors:  part of the family, a piece of 
my mind, keep it together 
 
 3. SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 
 Bodily Experience:  Physical movement involves 
starting and ending locations and a series of 
contiguous intermediate locations. 
 Structural Elements:  A SOURCE, a DESTINA-
TION, a PATH, and a DIRECTION along the 
path 
 Example Metaphors:  on the right path, don’t get 
sidetracked, see where it leads 
 
 4 LINK 
 Bodily Experience:  Eye “contact,” umbilical cord, 
stream of consciousness 
 Structural Elements:  Two entities, A and B, with a 
connecting LINK 
 Example Metaphors:  forming attachments, break-
ing ties, connecting the dots 
 
 5. CENTER-PERIPHERY 
 Bodily Experience:  We experience our bodies and 
other objects as having centers and peripheries 
 Structural Elements:  An ENTITY, a CENTER, and 
a PERIPHERY 
 Example Metaphors:  central idea, on edge, 
political moderate, fringe element 
 
6. BALANCE 
 Bodily Experience:  The experience of balancing 
during the act of walking 
 Structural Elements:  Two related entities, A and B, 
and a FULCRUM  
Example Metaphors:  weighing options, leaning 
towards it, balance of power 
 
It is important to understand that image schemas are not 
imagistic. That is to say, they are not mental 
representations of imagery. Rather, they are schematic 
representations of perceptual patterns, and therefore 
conceptual in nature.
1,20
 Further, image schemas (often 
referred to as kinesthetic image schemas) are not 
founded on visual perception alone. Sound, touch, 
proprioception, and perhaps even smell may contribute 
to the establishment of schema useful for structuring 
abstract concepts. However, because the vision system 
is, by far, the most significant perceptual channel, image 
schemas are predominantly visually oriented. Finally, 
image schemas are also composeable, that is, base 
schemas can be combined to form more complex 
conceptual structures, and they can undergo mental 
transformations from type of schema to another.  
 
In the years since Johnson first advanced this idea, there 
has been spirited debate in the research community over 
the defining characteristics of an image schema. While 
the debate continues, a general consensus has emerged 
regarding the standard inventory, shown in Table 1. The 
schemas listed below have been culled from a number 
of individual publications. A reference to the 
publication in which each schema was first described is 
provided for each entry. Note that Table 1 is not 
intended to be comprehensive or definitive, but only to 
provide a sense of the key concepts that have been 
discussed in the literature. In addition, I have taken 
some liberties in organizing the schemas in Table 1 into 
groups of related concepts that differ somewhat from 
previously published organizations.  
 
The evidence for the psychological and neurological 
reality of image schemas is mounting, and is emerging 
from a wide variety of disciplines. Talmy’s original 
linguistic studies in the 1970s and 80s established that 
spatial-relations terms in various languages could be 
analyzed in terms of combinations of a limited number 
of fundamental and universal schemas. Mandler’s 
studies of learning in infants in the early 1990s found 
that image schema theory provided an excellent 
explanation for observed patterns of infant learning and 
conceptualization.
21
 In 1995, Gibbs and Colston 
summarized empirical evidence from cognitive and 
developmental psychology studies that provided some 
of the first objective evidence for the “psychological 
reality” of image schemas.22 
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More recent research has shown that brain regions 
responsible for controlling motor actions are, in fact, 
actively engaged during abstract thought. For example, 
a recent series of psycholinguistic studies measured the 
time people took to process simple metaphorical phrases 
such as push an issue. These showed that people 
respond more quickly to metaphorical phrases that 
match immediately preceding actions (e.g., the act of 
physically grasping an object, followed by the phrase 
grasp the concept) than they do to phrases that don’t 
match the action (e.g., kicking a ball, followed by the 
phrase grasp the concept).
23
 This strongly suggests that 
the sensorimotor cortex is somehow involved in abstract 
thinking. In 
24
, Rohrer summarizes evidence from 
cognitive neurosciences research that shows that the 
sensorimotor cortical areas of the brain apparently do 
play a large role in semantic comprehension tasks. For 
example, functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies show that it is possible to activate the 
somatomotor neural maps using not only perceptual, but 
also linguistic, input. Together, this evidence 
“support[s] the hypothesis that semantic understanding 
takes place via image schemata located in the same 
cortical areas which are known to map sensorimotor 
activity” (ibid.). 
 
Lakoff’s Spatialization of Form hypothesis is a general 
theory of conceptual organization that elaborates the 
role that image schemas play in semantic 
comprehension.
2
 The Spatialization of Form hypothesis 
holds that conceptual structures used for organizing 
abstract concepts have an image-schematic basis. 
Existential 
 
OBJECT1 
 
Spatial Relation 
 
ABOVE2 
ACROSS2 
ADJACENCY1 
CENTER-PERIPHERY1 
CONTACT1 
CONTAINMENT1 
COVERING2 
(Relative) LENGTH2 
LINEAR ORDER2 
NEAR-FAR1 
(Relative) SCALE1 
SUPPORT1 
 
Spatial Form 
 
COMPACTNESS23 
PATH1 
STRAIGHT49 
SURFACE1 
ROUGH/BUMPY-SMOOTH24 
 
Spatial Orientation 
 
FRONT-BACK2 
LEFT-RIGHT50 
UP-DOWN2 
VERTICALITY2 
Spatial Motion 
 
ANIMATE MOTION21 
CAUSED MOTION21 
INANIMATE MOTION21 
LOCOMOTION44 
SELF MOTION21 
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL1 
 
Compositional 
 
COLLECTION1 
COMPLEXITY23 
FULL-EMPTY1 
LINK1 
MATCHING1 
MASS COUNT1 
PART-WHOLE1 
 
Transformational 
 
EXPANSION18 
MERGING1 
MULTIPLEX TO MASS2 
PATH FROM MOTION2 
PATH TO ENDPOINT2 
PATH TO OBJECT MASS2 
REFLEXIVE2 
ROTATION2 
SPLITTING1 
SUPERIMPOSITION1 
 
Balance 
 
AXIS BALANCE1 
EQUILIBRIUM1 
POINT BALANCE1 
TWIN-PAN BALANCE1 
 
Process Dynamics 
 
AGENCY51 
CAUSE51 
CYCLE1 
CYCLIC CLIMAX1 
ENABLEMENT1 
PROCESS1 
ITERATION1 
 
Force Dynamics 
 
ATTRACTION1 
BLOCKAGE1 
COMPULSION1 
COUNTERFORCE1 
DIVERSION1 
MOMENTUM52 
RESISTANCE52 
RESTRAINT1 
RESTRAINT REMOVAL1 
 
Table 1. Consolidated list of published image schemas. The reference numbers provided for each schema 
indicate the publication in which it was first described. 
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Further, it associates particular key conceptual 
structures with specific image schemas, as follows: 
 
 Categories (in general) are understood in terms of 
CONTAINMENT schemas. 
 Hierarchical structure is understood in terms of 
PART-WHOLE schemas and UP-DOWN 
schemas. 
 Relational structure is understood in terms of 
LINK schemas. 
 Radial structure in categories is understood in 
terms of CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. 
 Foreground-background (i.e., salient vs. contex-
tual) structure is understood in terms of FRONT-
BACK schemas. 
 Linear quantity scales are understood in terms of 
UP-DOWN schemas and LINEAR ORDER 
schemas. 
 
Lakoff describes this organizing process as a meta-
phorical mapping of spatial structure into conceptual 
structure. In this way, concepts are given meaning 
according to the image schematic structures with which 
they are associated. 
 
Image schemas play a role not only in semantic 
comprehension processes, but are also likely funda-
mental components of abstract reasoning processes, as 
well. According to this view, image schemas are 
employed in reasoning because they afford 
opportunities for mental operations such as pattern 
completion and mental simulation that are grounded in 
everyday experience. Recall that image schemas are 
generally propositional in form, characterized by 
predicate-argument structures that have associated 
inferential properties. Deane
19
 illustrates this concept 
with a list of inferences commonly activated by the 
CONTAINMENT schema: 
 
i) Containment protects contained objects from 
external forces; 
ii) actions within a container are constrained by its 
boundaries; 
iii) consequently, the location of a contained object 
is dictated by the location of the container; 
iv) the container restricts one’s ability to observe the 
contained object, depending on one’s ability to 
see into the container; 
v) containment is transitive: if A is in B, and B is in 
C, then A is in C. 
Language that invokes the CONTAINMENT schema 
and instantiates it with entity-arguments therefore 
entails CONTAINMENT-specific inferences about 
those entities. Consequently, phrases such as “Joe is in 
the Army” entail inferences such as “Joe’s actions are 
constrained” and “where the Army goes, Joe goes.” 
Other schemas, for example SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, 
entail different inferences according to the physical 
experiences on which they are based. Graphics 
theoretically instantiate similar mental models. It seems 
likely, therefore, that much of the power of information 
graphics as reasoning tools stems from similar 
mechanisms. 
 
Image schematic characteristics of 
metaphorical information graphics 
 
As previously discussed, information graphics that 
depict the characteristics of inherently spatial 
phenomena can be considered graphical analogs of the 
things they represent. However, many information 
graphics portray relations among non-spatial, abstract 
concepts in spatial terms, and are therefore metaphorical 
in nature. Many of these graphics seem to function by 
virtue of the fact that they employ graphical patterns 
that mimic spatial patterns that have become entrenched 
as image schemas. The forms and spatial configurations 
of lexical and graphical elements within information 
graphics foster the construal of mental models that 
structure the concepts associated with the elements 
according to familiar image-schematic patterns. In this 
way, the graphics become meaningful and are 
understood. 
 
As a case in point, consider the schematic repre-
sentations of bar charts shown in Fig. 1. The charts are 
presented unlabeled in order to emphasize their 
structural (i.e., syntactic, vs. semantic) characteristics. 
Fig. 1(a) shows a conventional example, depicting bars 
with aligned bases. This arrangement enables relative 
and absolute scale (i.e., length) readings to be 
performed via inspection of the unaligned “upper” ends 
of the bars. Fig. 1(b) shows bars of the same length, but 
with their tops aligned, rather than their bottoms. 
Subjectively, 1(b) is more difficult to interpret than 1(a), 
in terms of performing both absolute length readings 
and relative length comparisons. 1(b) also just “feels 
wrong.” It can be said to be counterintuitive. 
 
This seems due to the fact that vertically oriented bar 
charts, like many other common statistical graphics, are 
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(a)  (b) 
 
Figure 1.  Comparison of otherwise identical bar charts employing MORE IS UP (a) vs. MORE IS DOWN 
(b) metaphorical mappings. Subjectively, (a) is quantitatively and comparatively easier to read, and feels more 
“intuitively correct,” than (b). 
 
 
interpreted in terms of the metaphor MORE IS UP.
8 
This metaphor is nearly universal across cultures and 
languages, reflected in English statements such as “the 
crime rate is going up” and “turn the heat down.” 
MORE IS UP consists of a mapping of a source domain 
that includes the UP-DOWN and SCALE image 
schemas into the target domain of relative quantities of 
things (not necessarily physical objects, but potentially 
also unitized abstract concepts such as quarterly sales). 
Experientially, we learn to correlate greater quantities 
with upward directionality in numerous ways. Adding 
objects to a pile or liquid to a container causes the 
surface to rise. As we mature physically (i.e., become 
“more”) we increase in height (not length), as do other 
things in our experience, such as plants. According to 
image schema theory, these recurrent experiences 
become subconsciously entrenched, and subsequently 
serve to structure concept formation in analogous 
situations.  
 
The bar chart shown in Fig. 1(b) “feels wrong” because 
the alignment of the bar tops promotes interpretation in 
terms of the metaphor MORE IS DOWN, which is 
contrary to our everyday experience. In experience, 
vertically oriented items more commonly have their 
bases aligned than their tops, as we typically place them 
on some common surface (in the presence of gravity) 
for comparison purposes. Inverted bar charts such as 
that shown in Fig. 1(b) are occasionally encountered in 
practice, but are almost invariably used to indicate a 
decrease in some quantity (e.g., the price of a stock), 
and therefore still conform to the MORE IS UP 
metaphor. Horizontal orientations, of course, are also 
commonly employed for bar charts. However, unlike 
vertical charts, there is apparently no preferred (left-
right) orientation.
3
 This is likely due to the fact that, 
experientially, there is no perceived asymmetry to the 
world along the horizontal axis as there is in the vertical 
(ibid.).  
 
Another example of a type of information graphic that 
has an image schematic basis is the Euler diagram. 
Several previous authors have noted that Venn/Euler 
diagrams employ a visual metaphor based on the 
CONTAINMENT schema.
2,4
 In 
17
, Lakoff and Nunez 
argue that the embodied concepts of collection and 
containment underlie much of mathematics in general, 
and set theory, in particular. Recall that the structural 
elements of this schema include an INTERIOR, a 
BOUNDARY, and an EXTERIOR; this schema is 
depicted graphically in Fig. 2(a). As children, we learn 
the concepts of collection and containment early on 
through play, putting objects into containers and taking 
them out again, putting containers into other containers, 
etc.
20 
As described in the previous section, these 
experiences ingrain in us a mental model of containment 
that we naturally employ in abstract reasoning. The 
novel invention of the idea of intersecting containers 
enabled the depiction of more complex logical relations 
such as those shown in Fig. 2(b). Note that we can 
conceive of, and reason about, the abstract concept of 
containment independent of the existence of any 
contained objects. This can be reflected in diagrams 
such as that shown in Fig. 2(c). Euler diagrams, like bar 
charts, are intuitively understood because they are 
directly construed in terms of embodied spatial 
schemata. 
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Network diagrams also seem to have an image 
schematic basis. However, network diagrams appear to 
have much deeper cognitive roots than the graphics 
discussed so far. According to Lakoff,
2
 mental models 
(e.g., such as those instantiated in working memory by 
inspection of a graphic) have two key aspects, namely 
ontology and structure. Ontological elements may be 
either basic-level concepts such as entities, actions, 
states, etc., or they may be concepts characterized by 
cognitive models of other types (e.g., scripts). Structure 
in a mental model “consists of the properties of the 
elements and the relations obtaining among them” 
(ibid.). Recall that, according to the Spatialization of 
Form hypothesis, concepts are themselves conceived of 
in terms of the OBJECT schema, while semantic 
relations among concepts are understood in terms of the 
LINK schema. In other words, structural cognitive 
models
vii
 have a graph-like structure defined in terms of 
the OBJECT/LINK schema pair. We think largely in 
terms of objects and relations, of “connections” among 
ideas. 
 
The ubiquity of node/link diagram-based visualization 
tools testifies to the central role of the OBJECT/LINK 
schema in human thought. Examples include UML 
diagrams, flow charts, depictions of communications 
patterns, organization charts, “link charts,” social 
network diagrams, and “mind maps,” among a myriad 
of others. Although the semantics of these diagrams 
vary according to their ontological characteristics, their 
structural (i.e., schematic) aspects are similarly 
understood in terms of the general nature of the 
OBJECT/LINK image schema on which they are 
commonly based. These structural interpretations, in 
turn, theoretically guide interpretation of the ontological 
components of the diagrams to generate a gestalt 
interpretation of the diagrams as a whole. 
 
The structure of a given network diagram can generally 
be interpreted in a number of different ways. Selection 
of a particular interpretive mode is likely driven not 
only by the ontological and structural characteristics of 
the design, but also by pragmatic factors such as viewer 
goals and context. Structure clearly plays a significant 
role in interpretation, however, and this structural 
interpretation likely has an experiential basis. Consider, 
for example, the series of simple schematic network 
diagrams depicted in Fig. 3(a-d). Fig. 3(a) shows an 
otherwise undifferentiated network defining a 
topological structure. Fig. 3(b) shows a PART-WHOLE 
interpretation, in which visual discontinuities such as 
curvature minima
25
 (or possibly matching with 
geometric primitives
26
) guide interpretation of the 
network as an object with component parts. Figure 3(c) 
illustrates a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL interpretation in 
which meaning is derived in the form of a path traversal 
through the network. 
 
As discussed in section 3, image schemas are closely 
associated with gestalt perceptual principles. It follows 
that node layout should significantly influence structural 
interpretation and attendant image schematic construal. 
Diagrams depicting identical network topologies but 
with differing node placements will result in different 
conceptualizations. For example, graph layouts such as 
those shown in Fig. 4(d) promote gestalt grouping of 
nodes into discrete sets according to spatial proximity, 
resulting in an entirely different PART-WHOLE  
    (a)    (b)  (c) 
 
Figure 2.  Venn/Euler diagrams illustrating interpretation of set membership by means of the CONTAINMENT 
schema-based visual metaphor. (a) schematic graphical representation of the CONTAINMENT image schema 
(b) OBJECT entities in nested and intersecting “containers,” (c) a more abstract representation of intersection 
and containment 
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 (a) (b) 
 
 (c) (d) 
 
Figure 3.  Examples of alternate image schematic interpretations of network diagram structure. (a) a simple node-
link diagram, (b) illustration of a PART-WHOLE interpretation influenced by structural inflection points (arrows), 
(c) illustration of a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL interpretation involving path following from node “A” to node “B,” 
(d) illustration of a node layout that promotes an interpretation according to gestalt perceptual grouping principles. 
 
 
interpretation than that shown in 4(b). Node layout thus 
has a profound effect on the ways in which the 
ontological characteristics of the associated nodes are 
construed. 
 
Hierarchical organization by generalization is another 
key strategy that humans use in conceptualization. Not 
surprisingly, developing strategies for depicting and 
interacting with hierarchically organized information 
has been a key focus of the information visualization 
community. According to the Spatialization of Form 
hypothesis, hierarchical structure is understood in terms 
of PART-WHOLE schemas and UP-DOWN schemas. 
PART-WHOLE relationship structure, in turn, is 
commonly (but not exclusively) understood in terms of 
OBJECT and LINK schemas. This OBJECT and LINK 
conceptual structure is frequently depicted graphically 
as a node/edge network structure. In the case of 
hierarchy diagrams, part-whole compositional structure 
originates from a single “root” node that conceptually 
represents the WHOLE. 
 
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the fact that 
graphical representations of hierarchical conceptual 
structures commonly reflect a preferred vertical 
orientation that is in agreement with the Spatialization 
of Form hypothesis. In a survey of hierarchy diagrams 
in scientific textbooks, Tversky found that a vertical 
orientation was employed by 45 of 48 diagrams 
sampled.
4
 Importantly, vertical relations among the 
entities depicted in the diagrams were significant, but 
horizontal relations were arbitrary. Further, the “root” of 
the hierarchy was almost invariably located at the top, 
and represented what Tversky referred to as a 
conceptual “ideal” of some kind. This preferred vertical 
and directed orientation suggests that some factor other 
than graphical convention is involved. 
 
 
A 
B 
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It seems likely that such graphics have an image 
schematic basis. I speculate that the experiential source 
may be the human form (see Figs. 4a and 4b). The 
human figure possesses all the necessary criteria to 
serve as an image schematic source domain for this 
metaphor, including the facts that it is pervasively 
encountered in experience, is well understood, and is 
well and simply structured.
2
 Further, the human form 
presents a hierarchical branching structure originating at 
the head, which is almost invariably located at the top of 
the body. Anecdotally, the head/face serves as the focus 
of attention during interpersonal interactions, and could 
thus arguably be considered the psychological “origin” 
of the human form, conceptually representing the 
WHOLE. Vertically oriented tree diagrams and the 
human form can thus be considered to be both 
structurally and semantically aligned. 
 
A large variety of other graphical techniques have been 
developed for depicting hierarchically organized 
information. Many of these employ visual metaphors 
that also seem to have image schematic bases. For 
example, radial layouts such as those described in 
27
 and 
28
 theoretically promote interpretation of hierarchically 
organized PART-WHOLE structures in terms of the 
OBJECT/LINK and CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas, 
in which the “ideal” is located at the center of the 
display, with subordinate entities located at 
progressively greater distances away. Techniques such 
as the TreeMap
29
 and related visualizations
30,31
 seem to 
be based on the CONTAINMENT schema, depicting 
PART-WHOLE structure in the form of nested 
containers. Interestingly, image schema theory predicts 
that the substantially different bases for depicting 
PART-WHOLE relationships employed by OBJECT/ 
LINK vs. CONTAINMENT-based designs would cause 
them to be understood via substantially different 
processes. This seems to be born out in the results of 
user studies that show agreement of task proficiency 
along roughly schema-specific lines.
32
 
 
So far, this discussion has centered on the image 
schematic characteristics of information graphics 
themselves. However, many of the interaction 
techniques that have evolved for use in information 
visualization software also seem to be founded on 
commonly encountered patterns of experience. For 
example, the technique of progressive disclosure in 
which additional detail is gradually revealed as a display 
is “zoomed” to a particular area of interest mimics the 
daily experience of perceiving greater detail in an object 
as we physically move closer to it. Conversely, as we 
physically move farther away from a collection of 
objects we eventually perceive them as fusing together  
into an indistinguishable visual mass, an effect reflected 
in the MULTIPLEX TO MASS schema. Graphical 
interactions with a mouse are analogous to physical 
object manipulations, and so forth. 
 
Space prohibits a detailed analysis of the full range of 
information graphics and interactive visualization 
techniques in existence, but it seems likely that most 
other such methods ultimately have similar image 
schematic bases. This seems to be the case for two 
reasons. First, historically, information designers have 
naturally evolved graphic tools that mirror and reinforce
    (a)   (b) 
 
Figure 4.  A possible experiential source for the visual metaphor employed in vertically oriented hierarchy 
diagrams (a) is the human form (b). 
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their own thought processes. As a consequence, 
information graphics have come to mimic the 
subconscious schematic spatial patterns that form the 
basis of much of our thought and reasoning. Secondly, 
humans naturally seem to interpret spatial patterns, in 
particular purposefully designed ones, in terms of image 
schematic analogs. These two phenomena may have set 
up a mutually reinforcing condition that has resulted in 
the invention and refinement of the particular types of 
graphic devices we use today. 
 
General discussion 
 
While definitions of the term information visualization 
vary,
33.34.35
 there seems to be a consensus that the notion 
refers to the application of data visualization techniques 
to non-spatial or conceptual data. This is perhaps best 
captured in Card et al.’s definition of information 
visualization as “the use of computer-supported, 
interactive, visual representations of abstract data to 
amplify cognition”.33 The use of the phrase “visual 
representations of abstract data” serves to distinguish 
the practice of information visualization from the 
visualization of physical measurement or simulation 
data (e.g., scientific visualization or cartography). 
Further, the use of the term “amplify cognition” implies 
a goal of somehow augmenting abstract reasoning 
processes. If human thought processes are, in fact, 
largely metaphorical in nature, and if these metaphorical 
processes commonly employ image schemas as source 
domains, then image schema theory can theoretically 
serve as a basis for designing “cognition amplifying” 
visualization tools. 
 
Fabrikant and Buttonfield
36
 have previously suggested 
that graphical metaphors designed to invoke image 
schematic mental models can be used as an aid to 
information retrieval. I present here the stronger 
argument that the “experiential logic” associated with 
such metaphors can be leveraged to support not only 
search tasks, but also sensemaking. The key idea is that 
mental structures and processes that have evolved for 
perceiving and doing are routinely appropriated by the 
human mind for understanding, knowing,
37
 and 
reasoning.
9
 These structures and processes can, in 
theory, be purposefully activated via graphical 
metaphors that mimic appropriate image schematic 
patterns. Through judicious data transformations and 
careful alignment of problem domain, data, and 
metaphor semantics, information visualization tools 
might be developed that support reasoning about 
abstract concepts in ways that are similar to natural 
modes of reasoning about comparable perceptual 
phenomena. In a limited sense, information visuali-
zation tools based on such metaphors might be said to 
“augment” or “amplify” cognitive processes associated 
with abstract reasoning by fostering mental simulation 
and pattern completion operations appropriate to the 
problem domain and target information. 
 
Metaphorical graphics ultimately seem to be founded on 
the base metaphor IDEAS (or MEANINGS) ARE 
OBJECTS.
8,38
 The “graphical” version of this is IDEAS 
ARE GRAPHICAL OBJECTS. In addition, in keeping 
with the metaphor LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE 
CONTAINERS (for ideas) (ibid.), I suggest that the 
metaphor INFORMATION GRAPHICS ARE CON-
TAINERS FOR IDEAS (represented as graphical 
objects) applies. The value of information graphics lies 
generally in their utility as forms of external memory 
and in their ability to support the generation of 
inferences associated with relations among ideas. 
 
Concepts (IDEAS) in information graphics (both 
analogical and metaphorical) are commonly conveyed 
via conventional signifiers such as text labels or 
symbols (both in the sense of Peirce’s definition of 
symbol),
39
 or, as discussed earlier, via mimetic 
depictions of physical objects (Peirce’s icons (ibid.)).viii 
While the meanings of iconic signs are (putatively) 
obvious, the meanings of nonlexical symbols (encoded, 
e.g., as shapes or colors) are typically conveyed through 
the use of a legend that maps (lexically expressed) 
concepts to corresponding signs. In an information 
visualization context, signifiers can represent concepts 
associated with the characteristics of individual 
information units (e.g., documents or database records), 
or with the aggregate properties of a collection of such 
units. 
 
It is generally accepted that the principal function of 
information graphics is to depict relations among ideas 
or concepts. Bertin argues this quite forcefully when he 
states “What is properly called [information] graphics 
depicts only the relationships established among 
components or elements”.27 Tversky echoes this 
position, stating “…graphic elements are generally used 
to represent elements in the world, and graphic space is 
used to represent the relations between elements”.3 
Information graphics therefore have two key aspects, 
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namely 1) graphical objects representing concepts, and 
2) a spatial configuration of those objects that expresses 
some systematic relation among their associated 
concepts. Consequently, I argue that information 
graphics fully qualify as either analogues to or 
metaphors for the information they represent according 
to Gentner’s structure-mapping model of analogy. This 
is to say that not only do they 1) express systematic 
relations among the elements of a target domain in 
terms of those of a (spatial) source domain, but 2) also 
preserve only selected attributes of elements in the 
target domain, 3) employ 1-1 mappings of elements 
from source to target domain, 4) are syntactically 
neutral, and 5) relations in the source domain apply 
identically in the target domain. 
 
Relations among concepts are expressed via meaningful 
spatial arrangements of lexical and nonlexical (i.e., 
GRAPHICAL OBJECT) concept signifiers. As with 
analogies in general, these signs and relations cor-
respond to the arguments and predicates, respectively, 
of a propositional system. In the case of graphical 
metaphors, the predicates commonly correspond to 
experiential patterns associated with, e.g., the 
manipulation and behavior of physical objects. Similar 
to linguistic metaphors, new knowledge is derived in the 
form of inferences based on metaphorical projection of 
the characteristics of these patterns to the abstract 
phenomenon the graphics depict. Unlike linguistic 
metaphors, however, concepts and relations in 
metaphorical information graphics are likely processed 
by the independent “what” and “where” neuroana-
tomical pathways thought to be responsible for object 
identification and spatial relationship processing, 
respectively, in the human visuoperceptual system.
40,41
 
Theoretically, this fact may account for the subjective 
sense that information graphics enable a form of 
“parallel cognitive processing” of the concepts they 
present. 
 
Meaning in metaphorical graphics is therefore 
considered a product of both the meanings associated 
with their component signifiers and that associated with 
the image schematic conceptual structures the graphics 
invoke. Collectively, these elements foster the construal 
of mental models in working memory that have image 
schematic structure and enable relationships among 
concepts to be understood via mental processes such as 
pattern completion and mental simulation. In the same 
way that, for example, “following” a “path” through a 
series of hyperlinked Web pages is construed as 
(egocentric) traversal of a physical path between 
contiguous physical locations,
ix
 inspecting a network 
diagram depicting the hyperlink connectivity between 
those same pages enables an exocentric understanding 
of their structure as adjacent and connected locations in 
space. By presenting hyperlink structures as a 
metaphorical “map” that equates Web pages with 
physical locations, an information designer can draw 
upon the entrenched mental machinery used to 
understand physical orientation and movements through 
space to enable viewers to comprehend an otherwise 
abstract, complex and essentially incomprehensible 
phenomenon.  
 
The inventory of image schemas presented in Table 1 
can thus theoretically form the basis for a corresponding 
inventory of graphical metaphors, a kind of 
metaphorical “grammar” used to express conceptual 
relations among symbolically represented concepts. The 
information design process therefore becomes one of 
matching the characteristics of the target information to 
a graphical construct that fosters reasoning in terms of 
spatial metaphors and schemas that are aligned with the 
problem domain. This process notionally involves the 
following steps: 
 
1) Identifying and/or deriving salient characteristics 
of the target information relative to the problem 
domain in question, 
2) Characterizing the reasoning processes appropriate 
to both the target information and the problem 
domain, 
3) Selecting one or more image schemas associated 
with the identified modes of reasoning, 
4) Selecting an appropriate set of signifiers for 
representing the salient concepts of the target 
information, and 
5) Generating a spatial representation that mimics the 
spatial structure of the selected image schema(s) 
and maps signifiers to concepts and spatial 
relations among signifiers to conceptual relations 
among concepts. 
 
Theoretically, information graphics designed according 
to this process will promote construal of, and reasoning 
about, the chosen characteristics of the target 
information in ways that are both intuitive and 
appropriate to the natures of both the information and 
the analysis problem. 
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As an example, consider that abstract dynamic 
phenomena seem to be understood in image schematic 
terms. In 
9
, Lakoff summarizes the metaphorical nature 
of event structure as follows: 
 
 States are bounded regions of space 
 Changes are movements into or out of bounded 
regions 
 Processes are movements 
 Actions are self-propelled movements 
 Causes are forces 
 Purposes are destinations 
 Means are paths to destinations 
 
Problems involving dynamic phenomena, for example 
the conduct of business mergers and acquisitions, are 
thus commonly conceived of in terms of dynamic forces 
and spatial movements. An information graphic 
designed to support reasoning about the tradeoffs 
among optional courses of action might take advantage 
of this by appropriately mapping salient characteristics 
of the problem domain to graphical elements configured 
in ways that promote appropriate image schematic 
structuring and reasoning. 
 
Such a graphic might, for instance, represent the initial 
and desired final states as bounded graphical regions of 
space. Alternative means of achieving the desired 
goal(s) might be represented as a series of parallel or 
intersecting paths connecting the starting and 
“destination” regions. Intermediate states associated 
with each course of action might be represented as 
sequential locations along the paths. The status of actors 
responsible for achieving the goals could be conveyed 
by symbols positioned at appropriate locations along the 
paths. The actual or hypothetical “progress” of the 
various actors toward or away from the goals could be 
portrayed as self-directed or caused movement (i.e., via 
animation). Impediments or enabling factors inhibiting 
or promoting the “progress” of the actors could be 
represented by graphical barriers or breaches, while 
arrows might be used to depict causal factors as forces 
impinging on the actors, or to represent causal relations 
among related events.
x
 
 
Such a graphic would thus metaphorically represent 
concepts associated with a complex set of interlocking 
strategic options as the elements of a dynamic and 
systematically related graphical “landscape” that could  
be interpreted in terms of intuitive image schematic 
patterns such as SURFACE, CONTAINMENT, PATH 
TO ENDPOINT, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CAUSED 
MOTION, COUNTERFORCE, BLOCKAGE, 
RESTRAINT, RESTRAINT REMOVAL, etc. In this 
way, the information designer promotes reasoning 
operations appropriate to the target information through 
the use of spatial patterns and animated movements that 
are structurally and semantically aligned with 
entrenched modes of reasoning about generic events. 
 
As a final thought, consider that it is generally taken for 
granted that information graphics should be intuitive. 
That is to say, they should graphically depict salient 
aspects of information in ways that enable them to 
“[attain] to direct knowledge or cognition without 
evident rational thought and inference.”xi In fact, much 
of the supposed utility of information visualization 
technologies can be said to stem from their purported 
ability to make abstract and complex phenomena 
intuitively understandable. Image schema theory 
provides a basis for understanding and characterizing 
the nature of this intuitiveness. Theoretically, graphics 
that clearly and concisely invoke image schematic 
structuring of the concepts they depict will be perceived 
as more “intuitively meaningful” than those which do 
not. If the metaphor itself is graphically intuitive and 
has been appropriately mapped to the information, then, 
in theory, the target information itself will also be 
understood “without evident rational thought.” 
 
Image schema theory provides a theoretical explanation 
for how and why information graphics become 
meaningful to a viewer, as well as an explanation for 
why certain graphics seem more intuitive than others. 
As presented here, it also supports a number of 
falsifiable predictions with regard to information 
graphics, including the following: 
 
1) Graphics that mimic image schematic patterns but 
that lack concept-signifying elements (i.e., that are 
purely schematic, e.g., Figs. 1-4) will still be 
construed as meaningful by viewers. 
2) Graphics that are image-schematically aligned will 
be judged subjectively as being more “intuitive” 
than those that are not. 
3) Image schema-aligned graphics will be learned 
more rapidly and with less effort than those that 
are misaligned or non-aligned. 
4) Graphics that align interpretation requirements 
with image-schemas having correspondingly 
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appropriate experiential “logic” will prove to be 
more effective reasoning tools than those that do 
not. 
 
Systematic psychological and software user studies are 
needed to validate or disprove these predictions before 
the full usefulness of the approach outlined here will be 
understood. 
 
While the application of image schema theory to the 
visualization of abstract information appears to be a 
potentially fruitful avenue of research, the ultimate 
value of this approach remains unclear. Arbitrary 
graphical patterns and interactions can become 
meaningful via learning. While it seems unlikely, it may 
be that the “intuitive” nature of image schema-aligned 
graphics only confers an advantage (if any) during 
learning, and that, with use, arbitrary visualization 
techniques become equally effective. Along these lines, 
Cooper
42
 has mounted a famously spirited attack on the 
use of high-level metaphors (such as the “desktop 
paradigm”) in user interface design, arguing that 
learned, “idiomatic” paradigms are preferable. The 
utility of high-level metaphors as the basis for general 
human-computer interactions remains debatable. 
However, the user interface components Cooper 
describes as paragons of idiomatic design (e.g., scroll 
bars, splitters, combo boxes) are all, in fact, based on 
experiential patterns of interaction with physical 
objects, and are generally metaphorical in nature. 
Metaphors such as these are so deeply ingrained in 
human thought processes that they are essentially 
inseparable from the concepts with which they are 
associated, a fact that ultimately accounts for much of 
their utility. Finally, image schemas are only one type of 
schema used in visuospatial reasoning.
43,44
 Aspectual 
schemas, scripts, etc. are all complementary or alternate 
candidates to serve as the basis for computerized tools 
for “amplifying cognition.”  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
To say “that is like this” is to attempt to make a poorly 
understood phenomenon more comprehensible by 
relating it to a more meaningful one. This is exactly 
what information graphics do. Such graphics present 
selected aspects of complex phenomena in ways that are 
more comprehensible than their original form. This is 
accomplished via structure-mapping processes in which 
discrete elements of a graphic map to selected natural or 
derived characteristics of the target phenomena in ways 
that equate spatial relations in the source graphic to 
spatial or non-spatial relations in the target. With 
repeated use, these mapping processes often become so 
ingrained as to function instead as a type of 
categorization. When this occurs, the analogical or 
metaphorical nature of the process becomes effectively 
invisible, and “the picture becomes the thing” it 
represents. 
 
I have argued that a primary distinction can be made 
between analogical graphics and metaphorical graphics. 
The two types differ according to the nature of the 
phenomena they represent. Analogical graphics depict 
inherently spatial phenomena in ways that preserve 
natural spatial relations present in the target. Such 
graphics serve to bring these phenomena within the 
limits of human perceptual, memory, and cognitive 
abilities. Thus geographic maps filter, abstract, and 
compress the spatial relationships among features of 
real terrains into human-scale artifacts that can be 
directly comprehended. Similarly, diagrams of 
microbial cell or molecular structures make selected 
spatial characteristics of the phenomena they depict 
perceivable and thus understandable. Such graphics are 
considered analogical because the source and target 
domains are both spatial in nature, and the spatial 
relations among elements are identical in source and 
target. 
 
Metaphorical graphics, on the other hand, present non-
spatial concepts in spatial terms. These relate abstract 
concepts in systematic ways that stimulate natural 
modes of conceptual structuring. Building on previous 
theory, I have argued that metaphorical graphics derive 
much of their meaning from their functional alignment 
with image schemas, cognitively entrenched patterns of 
physical experience that theoretically serve as a key 
bridge between perception and cognition.  These 
patterns serve to structure and constrain abstract 
reasoning processes via metaphorical projection 
operations that are grounded in everyday cognitive and 
perceptual experiences. I have suggested that 
metaphorical graphics promote the image schematic 
structuring of concepts in working memory by 
mimicking the visuospatial patterns responsible for the 
schema’s original formation. The sudden insights 
information graphics often induce – the “a-ha!” 
experience – can be theoretically explained as the 
inferential completion of such image schematic patterns. 
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Consequently, I have proposed that the standard 
inventory of image schemas derived from linguistic and 
cognitive studies can serve as the basis for developing a 
kind of visualization “grammar.”  Such a grammar 
would employ graphical analogs of image schematic 
patterns as syntactic elements that relate concepts 
expressed using conventional signifiers such as text, 
color, and symbology. Theoretically, graphics that 
purposefully align data and problem characteristics with 
appropriate image schematic graphical patterns can 
stimulate pattern completion and/or mental simulation 
processes that generate valuable new insights into the 
target phenomena they depict. I have presented a 
number of falsifiable predictions that can be used to test 
the validity of the theories presented here. 
 
The use of the words “on” and “in” in the title of this 
paper is testament to both the ubiquity and invisibility 
of spatial metaphors in everyday thought and language. 
If information visualization tools truly hold the potential 
to amplify cognition, such tools will employ graphical 
devices that in some way augment everyday modes of 
thought and reasoning. The centrality of spatial 
metaphor in human cognition suggests that image 
schema theory can provide a useful theoretical 
framework suitable for guiding the design and 
evaluation of such visualization tools. 
 
Endnotes 
 
i
 In the following discussion I will use the phrase 
“information graphics” to refer to static graphical 
representations of information and the phrase 
“information visualizations” to refer to the computer-
supported dynamic, interactive variants of information 
graphics, after Card et al.
33
. 
ii
 The High-level Perception (HLP) model of Chalmers 
et al.
45
 has been portrayed as a competitor to the 
structure-mapping model. However, Morrison and 
Dietrich
46
 point out that the two models, in fact, address 
different phenomena. They characterize HLP as a theory 
of analogy production, whereas structure-mapping is a 
theory of analogy comprehension. As the focus of the 
present discussion is the comprehension of graphical 
metaphors, structure-mapping theory is the most 
appropriate model. It is clear, however, that perceptual 
processes are central to both the production and 
comprehension of graphical metaphors. 
iii
 Poetic metaphors such as “the moon is a ghostly 
galleon” are highly complex phenomena that, while 
consistent with the structure-mapping model, are 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. For a 
comprehensive analysis of cognitive phenomena 
associated with poetic metaphors see 
47
. 
iv
 In 
48
, Bowdle and Gentner propose a mechanism by 
which conceptual metaphors arise. They theorize that 
novel metaphors are initially interpreted via structure-
mapping processes, but gradually become entrenched as 
general schemas with repeated exposure. Once 
entrenched such metaphors are conceptualized as a kind 
of category. 
v
 Theoretically, metaphors can be expressed via any 
sensory modality. Sonification techniques, for example, 
can be considered as metaphorical expressions if they 
express data patterns in terms of auditory patterns that 
have previously understood relational characteristics.  
vi
 All italics in original. 
vii
 As opposed to functional or other types of mental 
models.  
viii
 Peirce’s indexical signs are also frequently employed 
in information graphics, for example, in the form of text 
labels associated with graphical elements by their 
adjacency. 
ix
 The metaphor of physical movement employed in 
Web browsing is so strong it even extends to the 
possibility of “getting lost.” 
x
 See Tversky’s comments regarding the use of arrows 
in information graphics to portray causal relations.
3
 
xi
 Definition of “intuition,” Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary.  
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